Versailles Court of Appeal, 10 March 2026, No. 23/08579
In this decision, the Versailles Court of Appeal recalls the evidentiary requirements borne by a person claiming co-authorship of a musical work.
In this case, a musician who had taken part in recording sessions as part of sound creation projects claimed to have contributed to several compositions that were exploited without his consent. In the absence of a contractual framework, the dispute essentially turned on proof of his contribution and of its originality.
After recalling that protection requires a creation bearing the imprint of its author’s personality, the Court specifies that co-authorship requires an effective and original contribution to the work. It also recalls that the presumption of ownership only applies where the work has been disclosed under the name of the person relying on it, which had not been established in this case.
The Court upheld the first-instance judgment and refused to extend the recognition of rights to all of the works. It held that public references to a production made “in association with” the claimant were not sufficient to establish disclosure under his name. It further noted that exchanges concerning a possible allocation of rights, or acknowledging a creative input, were not sufficient to establish the originality of a contribution, since creation or improvisation does not necessarily amount to an original work.
Above all, the Court found that the claimant proceeded by way of general assertions, relying on musical similarities or common sound elements, without precisely identifying, work by work, the original elements reflecting the imprint of his personality. This lack of evidence justified the dismissal of the majority of his claims.
By contrast, the Court confirmed the recognition of rights in one identified work, corresponding to a specific musical sequence. It noted that the originality of this contribution had been admitted in the opposing party’s submissions and characterised that admission as a judicial admission, specifying that it concerned a question of fact carrying legal consequences. The Court therefore upheld the classification of the track incorporating that sequence as a work of joint authorship, recalling that an inequality of contributions does not preclude such classification. Finally, the Court confirmed the finding of infringement, holding that the registration and exploitation of that work without the co-author’s consent infringed his rights.
The decision thus confirms a consistent approach whereby co-authorship cannot be inferred from collaboration alone, nor from informal acknowledgements, but requires a precisely demonstrated original contribution. It also indirectly highlights the importance of formalising, at the outset, the respective roles and contributions of participants in creative projects.
